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Abstract. This study examines the impact of strengthening bank capital
supervision on bank behavior in the incomplete and complete enforcement of regu-
lations. In a dynamic model of banks facing idiosyncratic shocks, banks accumulate
regulatory capital and decrease charter value and lending in the short run, while in
the long run, the banking system achieves stability. To test the short-run implica-
tions, we utilize the introduction of the prompt corrective action program in Japan as
a natural experiment. Using some empirical specifications with bank- and loan-level
data, we find empirical evidence consistent with the theoretical predictions.
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1. Introduction The financial crisis from 2007 through 2009 prompted a debate about
bank regulation reforms, because the pre-crisis microprudential policies failed to cope with
large financial shocks. Accordingly, the new Basel III regulations propose a raise in bank
capital requirements. Considering preemptive microprudential policies for the stability of
the banking system, an active debate is on monitoring bank capital conditions as “ex-ante”
regulatory policies to reduce the cost of bank bailouts to the government. This study the-
oretically and empirically examines the effect of strengthening bank capital supervision on
bank behavior by addressing its impact on bank heterogeneity in lending, capital accumu-
lation, charter value, and default decisions from the short- and the long-run perspective.
Our study contributes not only to a paucity of theoretical literature analyzing micropruden-
tial regulation on bank capital requirements in heterogeneous dynamic models of banking
(Corbae and D’Erasmo (2014) and De Nicolo` et al. (2014)), but also to empirical literature
analyzing its causal impact on bank behavior (Bernanke and Lown (1991) and Peek and
Rosengren (1995)).
We begin by designing an equilibrium model consistently with standard corporate fi-
nance setups adapted to the peculiarities of banks (Flannery (2012)). In these setups, three
features characterize our model. First, we incorporate the traditional idea of “incomplete
enforcement” of regulations into modeling the strengthening bank capital supervision. The
literature on incomplete enforcement of regulations considers that some firms will choose
not to comply with regulations, depending on the probability of inspection and the size of
penalties (e.g., Stigler (1970), Polinsky and Shavell (1979), Viscusi and Zeckhauser (1979),
Jones (1989), Garvie and Keeler (1994), and Shleifer (2005)). We explicitly model the
strength of the financial agency’s capital regulatory pressure, as their inspection/monitoring
effort, that is, we describe this type of effort as the probability that bank capital regulators
inspect and then detect whether banks violate the capital regulation and are undercapital-
ized. However, previous studies, including De Nicolo` et al. (2014), model capital regulation
as prudential, which cannot be violated. In our model, penalties correspond to external
equity issuance by undercapitalized banks. We construct the model, so that if regulators
inspect banks and find that they do not meet the capital requirement, such undercapital-
ized banks must issue new equity, which is costly, because of informational asymmetries.
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Our model allows us to pin down bank behavior before and after strengthening regulatory
surveillance, for example, introducing prompt corrective action (PCA) policies, such that
the degree of inspection effort is set to a particular value as the probability of inspection, in
a dynamic analysis from incomplete to complete enforcement of capital regulations.1 To
our knowledge, this study is the first to explicitly model the strength of regulatory pressure,
as the degree of inspection effort in banking system dynamics.
Second, we consider banks whose regulatory capital is not necessarily constrained to
their capital requirements. In our model, banks face idiosyncratic profitability shocks to
their assets and equity issuance is costly because of informational asymmetries. In these
environments, equity capital absorbs losses from the banks’ assets, and thereby, protects
their charter value when their assets’ valuation experiences negative shocks.2 To this end,
we model the capital regulation as “occasionally binding,” whereas most previous studies
model it as “always binding.” Thus, our model allows us to analyze an equilibrium in which
banks accumulate capital buffers by retaining their profits beyond the required level because
of their precautionary motives, irrespective of whether capital regulation is incompletely
enforced or not. With stricter regulatory surveillance, banks increase their capital buffers to
prevent violation of capital requirements. Based on this theoretical insight, we empirically
examine how the introduction of the PCA changes the agency’s regulatory pressure by
checking the difference in the level of capital buffers before and after such introduction.
Third, our model effectively endogenizes the amount of deposits; therefore, the size of
banks’ balance sheet is flexibly changed by the strength of regulatory pressure. By contrast,
in the models of Corbae and D’Erasmo (2014) and DeNicolo et al. (2014), the amount of
deposits is an exogenous variable; consequently, in their models, banks cannot adjust the
1 As discussed in Section 3, bank capital regulations had been “softly implemented” or “incompletely
enforced” before the introduction of the PCA in the U.S. in the early 1990s (Jones and King (1995)) and
in Japan in the late 1990s (Kanaya and Woo (2000)). In this environment, regulators overlooked some
undercapitalized banks in the incomplete enforcement of capital regulations. However, in implementing
the PCA, regulators began examining the financial conditions of banks more seriously, requesting banks
to self-assess their assets rigorously. Taking these facts into account, we model the PCA as an “ex-ante”
capital regulation before violating the capital requirement, while previous studies such as Elizalde and
Repullo (2007) and DeNicolo et al. (2014) model it as “ex-post” regulation after violating the capital
requirements. The implications from our banking model involve dynamics in bank behavior before and
after the introduction of the PCA as an ex-ante capital regulation.
2 Thus, our model can address the economic capital of banks (see Elizalde and Repullo (2007)).
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size of their balance sheets flexibly, even if capital regulation tightens and banks’ funding
cost increases.3 As our primary interest is how the strengthening of regulatory pressure
changes bank behavior, including its lending, it is more appropriate to model the amount
of deposits to be endogenously determined in response to the degree of regulatory pressure.
Our dynamic model of heterogeneous banks derives the following theoretical insights
into the impact of strengthening capital regulation on bank behavior: in the short run, high-
leverage banks with high profitability, which are more likely to violate capital requirements,
respond to strengthening capital regulation. These high-leverage banks are more likely to
decrease lending, as they attempt to meet the capital requirement by contracting lending.
Some banks choose to default, as their charter value (market value of capital) drops below
zero. Thus, strengthening regulatory surveillance can temporarily cause a capital crunch
and financial instability, albeit gradually raising regulatory capital by retaining profits. In
contrast, in the long run, high-leverage banks accumulate sufficient regulatory capital to
the point they are no longer capital constrained, and achieve financial stability such that
banks’ default rate in post-PCA is lower than that in pre-PCA. Thus, accumulation of
regulatory capital because of strengthening capital regulation contributes to the stability
of the overall banking system.
Note that our dynamic model of banking has two different implications about the role of
strengthening capital regulation in stabilizing the banking system from the short- and long-
run perspectives. Our short-run implication on capital building by banks after strength-
ening capital regulation supports the following argument by Sarin and Summers (2016):
stricter capital regulation causes financial institutions to increase measures of regulatory
capital. However, such increase in regulatory capital is offset by a decline in the franchise
value of the financial institutions, and thus, the banking system becomes fragile, that is,
“measures of regulatory capital are flawed” (see also Atkeson et al. (2018), Begenau et al.
(2019), and Atkeson and d’Avernas (2020) for other theoretical explanations).4 Indeed,
3 More precisely, in the models of DeNicolo et al. (2014) and Corbae and D’Erasmo (2014), the amount
of deposits follows an exogenous AR(1) process.
4 Like us, these three studies also develop models of heterogeneous banks that explain the different
movements of market leverage and book leverage. Atkeson et al. (2018) and Atkeson and d’Avernas
(2020) attribute the main driver of this different movement to changes in returns to bank owners from
risk taking backed by government guarantees. In Begenau et al. (2019), the difference between the book
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Figure 1 shows that in Japan, the divergence between regulatory capital and the mar-
ket value of capital occurred simultaneously with the introduction of the PCA program,
which went into preliminary implementation in FY 1997 and took full effect in April 1998.
Moreover, as discussed above, our model also provides new insight into the role of micro-
prudential capital regulation in terms of its long-run consequence on the stability of the
banking system.
Next, we test the short-run implications of our dynamic model by utilizing, as a natural
experiment, the introduction of the PCA program in Japan, which requested banks to
rigorously self-assess their assets to lessen forbearance (Kanaya and Woo (2000)), similar
to the PCA in the U.S. (Jones and King (1995)). Several empirical studies focusing on
the direct link between explicit regulatory enforcement actions and the shrinkage of bank
loans revealed that banks subject to the PCA reduced their loans at a significantly faster
rate than those that were not (see Peek and Rosengren (1995) for the U.S. case). Woo
(2003) and Watanabe (2007) found empirical support for the capital crunch hypothesis in
fiscal year 1997, or March 1998, by demonstrating a positive and statistically significant
correlation between new lending growth and bank capital. These papers attributed their
results to the following fundamental changes in the Japanese financial system that year: the
substantial strengthening of the supervisory and regulatory framework, and the following
heightened scrutiny of the Japanese banks by the financial market (Ito and Harada (2005)).
However, such attribution of the capital crunch to the strengthening of bank capital
regulations is not based on any formal theoretical prediction. Our theoretical predictions
can establish the more formal lending channel of the strengthening capital regulations in
terms of how they affect bank behavior, including lending and capital building as well as
their charter value. Using bank-level panel data and bank-firm loan-level matched data,
we employ some empirical specifications for causal inference, finding that the preliminary
implementation of the PCA in FY 1997 decreased lending and charter value among highly
value and market value of equity arises because the book value of loans does not recognize losses caused
by credit shocks immediately, while the market value of loans does. The advantage over these models is
that our model endogenizes the bank balance sheet structure and introduces persistent idiosyncratic credit
shocks, thereby, providing cross-sectional implications for heterogeneous bank behavior before and after
the strengthening of supervisory pressure.
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profitable and/or leveraged banks more substantially, albeit increasing the regulatory cap-
ital of all banks and decreasing their charter value and loans. This result is consistent with
our short-run theoretical predictions.
Our paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops a dynamic model with hetero-
geneous banks and then derives theoretical implications regarding the causal impacts of
strengthening bank capital regulations on bank behavior. Section 3 explains our empirical
design and the dataset based on the PCA in Japan. Section 4 reports the results of our
empirical analysis. Section 5 offers conclusions.
2. Dynamic Model with Heterogeneous Banks We now develop a dynamic model
of banking to investigate the impact of increasing surveillance pressure by the government
on decision making by banks’ in terms of capital structure and lending.
2.1. Environment The economy consists of islands (measure one) indexed by i. An
island can be similar to an industry or a state (or a prefecture in Japan). Importantly, as
will become clear, there is an idiosyncratic shock specific to i that cannot be diversified
away. Each island has its own bank that supplies credit monopolistically to firms on the
island.5
At the end of period t − 1, the bank on the island i with its equity et (we write et
rather than eit: index i is omitted hereafter) chooses the amount of dividends πt to pay to
its owner (banker) and the amount of bank capital to hold in the next period;6
nt = et − πt > 0, (1)
where et is the bank equity capital before the dividend distribution, while nt is the bank
equity capital after the dividend distribution. We call nt as “ex-ante” equity capital and
et as “ex-post” equity capital, because the former can be adjusted by the bank before the
5 We do not model firms explicitly. Rather, we assume that banks face their own loan demand, and given
this demand, they maximize their profits. This assumption fits well, especially for Japanese commercial
banks until the late 1990s, when the regulatory capital surveillance strengthened. Until the late 1990s,
there were a few local commercial banks in each prefecture in Japan, and they lent exclusively to local
firms in the Japanese main bank system (Aoki and Patrick (1994)).
6 We assume that ex-ante equity capital cannot be negative, because if it is negative, a bank run occurs
and the regulator closes the bank, in line with Elizalde and Repullo (2007).
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credit shock (introduced below) occurs, while the latter cannot. We permit banks to issue
new equity (i.e., πt < 0). In this case, it costs the bank (1 + a) per unit of equity to issue
because of problems caused by the informational asymmetry between equity issuers and
investors (Bolton and Freixas (2006)).7
At the beginning of period t, the bank chooses the amount of deposits Dt to gather,
and loans Lt to give (i.e., prepares the balance sheet), satisfying the following balance sheet
constraint;
Lt = nt +Dt. (2)
After preparing the balance sheet (intermediate stage of period t), with probability
p, the regulator approaches the bank and inspects whether the bank meets the capital
requirement;
Φt ≡
nt
Lt
≥ φ, (3)
where Φt is the ex-ante equity capital to the loans ratio, and φ is the required level. If the
regulator finds that the bank does not meet the requirement, the bank needs to issue new
equity, φLt − nt, to satisfy the requirement, which costs the bank (1 + a)(φLt − nt).
8
Then, an idiosyncratic shock specific to the island, zt+1, occurs to the quality of credits,
and revenue zt+1f(Lt) is realized. f(·) is the revenue function of loans that satisfies f(0) =
0, f > 0, f ′ > 0, and f ′′ < 0 in line with DeNicolo et al. (2014).9 Credit shocks zt+1 are
i.i.d across islands (banks) and follow an AR(1) process;
log zt+1 = (1− ρ) log z + ρ log zt + ǫt+1, (4)
7 This reduced-form modeling of equity issuance cost is in line with Cooley and Quadrini (2001), Hen-
nessy and Whited (2007), and Corbae and D’Erasmo (2014).
8 This formulation means that banks replace deposits with equity capital, rather than decrease loans,
to satisfy the requirement at the intermediate stage. This assumption is based on the fact that loans are
illiquid, while deposits are liquid.
9 In DeNicolo et al. (2014), credit shocks are aggregate (systemic) shocks. In contrast to DeNicolo et
al. (2014), we assume that credit shocks are idiosyncratic in order to study the cross-sectional implications
between profitability, capital accumulation, and capital constrained lending behavior of banks. These
idiosyncratic shocks generate a rich cross-sectional distribution of bank capital structure.
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where ǫt ∼ N(0, σ
2).
At this moment, banks choose whether to default on the deposits and exit, or repay and
continue their businesses. If a bank chooses to default, its value is zero because of limited
liability. When the bank chooses to continue, it repays the deposits (i.e., the bank clears
the balance sheet). Then, equity capital at the end of period t (ex-post equity capital),
et+1, is realized as
et+1 =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
EN(Lt, nt; zt+1) ≡ zt+1f(Lt)− R
d (Lt − nt)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡Dt
−k if not inspected (with prob. 1− p),
EI(Lt, n; zt+1) if inspected (with prob. p),
(5)
where EI(Lt, n; zt+1) is defined as follows:
EI(Lt, n; zt+1) ≡
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
EN(Lt, nt; zt+1) if Φt ≥ φ,
EN(Lt, nt; zt+1)− (1 + a−R
d)(φLt − nt) if Φt < φ.
(6)
In equation (5), EN(Lt, nt; zt+1) is the ex-post equity capital of the bank with the credit
shock zt+1, if the bank is not inspected by the regulator, which occurs with the probability
1− p. Rd is deposit rate, and k is the fixed operating cost in the loan market.
EI(Lt, nt; zt+1) is the ex-post equity capital of the bank inspected by the regulator. If
inspected, the situation can be divided into two cases, as shown in (6). If the bank satisfies
the capital requirement (Φt ≥ φ), its ex-post equity capital is the same as E
N (Lt, nt; zt+1).
However, if it does not satisfy the requirement (Φt < φ), the undercapitalized bank needs to
issue new equity up to φLt, which costs it (1+a)(φLt−nt). Consequently, its ex-post equity
capital becomes EN(Lt, φLt; zt+1)−(1+a)(φLt−nt) = E
N(Lt, nt; zt+1)−(1+a−R
d)(φLt−
nt). This expression means that issuing equity decreases the ex-post equity capital to the
extent that issuing equity is more costly than collecting deposits. Thus, issuing equity at
the intermediate stage decreases bank value at the end of the period. Banks increase their
ex-ante equity capital by retaining their profits to avoid this penalty for not complying
with regulation (i.e., costly external equity issuance by undercapitalized banks), when the
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surveillance pressure is strengthened, or inspection probability p increases.
Figure 2 summarizes the events, bank actions, and the changes in the bank balance
sheet, along the timeline.
2.2. Bank Problem and Stationary Equilibrium In period t, the bank’s objective
function is the expected discounted value of dividends;
Et
∞∑
i=0
βiΘ(πt+i), (7)
where an expectation operator (Et) is used with respect to the credit shocks zt+1, β is the
banker’s discount factor, and Θ(·) is the function;
Θ(π) =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
π if π ≥ 0,
π(1 + a) if π < 0,
(8)
which indicates that equity issuance is costly, as mentioned above. The parameter a is the
equity issuance cost, as introduced in subsection 2.1.
We now formulate the bank problem recursively and define the equilibrium.
2.2.1. Bank Decision Making At the end of period t, a bank with equity capital et
and idiosyncratic credit shock zt chooses {πt, Lt, Dt, nt ≥ 0, Φt} to solve the following
recursive problem;
V (et; zt) = maxΘ(πt) + β ·
[
p
∑
zt+1
P (zt|zt+1)max
{
V
(
EI(Lt, nt; zt+1); zt+1
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
repay(xI=0)
, 0︸︷︷︸
default(xI=1)
}
︸ ︷︷ ︸
inspected by regulator
+ (1− p)
∑
zt+1
P (zt|zt+1)max
{
V
(
EN (Lt, nt; zt+1); zt+1
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
repay(xN=0)
, 0︸︷︷︸
default(xN=1)
}
︸ ︷︷ ︸
not inspected
]
, (9)
subject to constraints (1), (2), (3), (4), (5), and (6), where V (et; zt) is the value of the bank
at the end of the period t− 1, and P (zt|zt+1) is the transition matrix of credit shocks from
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zt to zt+1. We define the default policy x(et; zt, zt+1), which is contingent on whether the
bank is inspected, and the realized credit shock zt+1 as follows:
xi(et; zt, zt+1) =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
0 Repay and Continue,
1 Default and Exit,
(10)
where i ∈ {I (inspected), N (not inspected)}. We express the other policy functions of the
bank, as the solutions of the above decision problem as follows:
πt = π(et; zt), (11)
Lt = L(et; zt), (12)
Dt = D(et; zt), (13)
nt = n(et; zt), (14)
Φt = Φ(et; zt). (15)
2.2.2. Entry of New Banks and Stationary Distribution We assume if a bank with
a state (et; zt) defaults and exits the market, it is replaced with a new bank with the state
(et = 0; zt).
10 This means that a new bank has zero equity capital, and initially, it has
to use costly external finance to raise capital to meet the capital requirement. Using the
policy functions in subsection 2.2.1, we can express the law of motion of the distribution
ζt(de; zi) as follows:
ζt+1(de
′; zj) =
∫ ∑
i
P (zi|zj) · ζt(de; zi) ·
[{
p · I{xI(e; zi, zj) = 0} · I{Φ(e; zi) ≥ φ}
+(1− p) · I{xN(e; zi, zj) = 0}
}
· I{de′ ∋ EN(L(e; zi), n(e; zi); zj)}
+p · I{xI(e; zi, zj) = 0} · I{Φ(e; zi) < φ} · I{de
′ ∋ EI(L(e; zi), n(e; zi); zj)}︸ ︷︷ ︸
Incumbent banks
10 This assumption ensures that there always exists one bank on each island, and the aggregated measure
of banks over islands is exactly one.
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+{
p · I{xI(e; zi, zj) = 1} · I{Φ(e; zi) ≥ φ}+ (1− p) · I{x
N(e; zi, zj) = 1}
+p · I{xI(e; zi, zj) = 1} · I{Φ(e; zi) < φ}
}
· I{de′ ∋ 0}︸ ︷︷ ︸
New entrants
]
, (16)
where I{·} is an indicator function, and Ei(L, n; z) (i ∈ {I,N}) is the function in (5) and
(6). The initial terms of the right-hand side represent the distribution of incumbent banks,
and the later terms represent new entrants with zero capital, which replace the defaulting
banks. A stationary distribution is ζ∗ satisfying ζt+1 = ζt = ζ
∗ (invariant distribution).
2.2.3. Definition of Stationary Equilibrium Given the policy parameter for capital
requirement φ, inspection probability p, bank revenue function f(·), the process of credit
shocks zt, deposit rate R
d, and a mass of new entrants B, a stationary equilibrium of the
banking industry is a set of
1. policy and value functions for banks {xi(e; z, z′), π(e; z), L(e; z), D(e; z), n(e; z),
Φ(e; z), V (e; z)} that satisfy the bank problem,
2. stationary distribution of banks ζ∗(e; z) implied by the policy functions that are
derived in item 1.
2.3. Calibration and Model Implications We now present the results of the cali-
bration and simulation of the model to derive theoretical and cross-sectional predictions
for the strengthening regulatory pressure, that is, increasing the inspection probability p
in the incomplete enforcement of capital regulation.
2.3.1. Credit Shock First, we calibrate the dynamics of credit shocks. Following De
Nicolo` et al. (2014), we proxy the shock process by the return on bank assets (ROA) before
taxes; hence, z in subsection 2.1 corresponds to ROA. The sample period is fiscal years 1975
through 1996, just before the preliminary implementation of the PCA in FY 1997, which
took full effect in April 1998, to Japanese commercial banks. We estimate the following
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AR(1) process of ROAit for bank i in period t:
logROAit = (1− ρ)logROA0 + ρlogROAit−1 + γi + uit, (17)
where γi is the bank fixed effects, and uit is i.i.d. and distributed N(0, σ). The middle
panel of Table 1 shows the results. We then apply the method of Tauchen (1986) to the
AR(1) process in equation (17) to obtain a finite state Markov process P (zt|zt+1).
2.3.2. Equity Issuance Cost and Inspection Probability Next, we jointly calibrate
the parameters, fixed cost (k), equity issuance cost (a), and inspection probability (p).
Let us denote the inspection probability before and after increasing inspection/monitoring
efforts as p0 and p1 (p0 < p1), respectively. We assume that other parameters (i.e., economic
conditions) do not change.
Table 2 shows the change in averaged capital surplus, defined as capital ratio minus the
required capital level, before and after the strengthening of capital supervision; the prelimi-
nary implementation of the PCA in FY 1997 and its full effect in FY 1998 (see Section 3 for
more details). Note that because of weak regulatory pressure, or incomplete enforcement,
banks had relatively lower capital surplus (around 1%) before the preliminary implemen-
tation in FY 1997. However, after the preliminary implementation, banks accumulated
capital surplus gradually, by retaining profits; consequently, it reached approximately 4%,
much higher than 1% during pre-strengthening.
We assume that after the preliminary implementation of the PCA in FY 1997, the
enforcement is complete, that is, p1 = 1, which means that regulators rigorously inspect all
banks. This implies that if bank capital ratio is below the required level, undercapitalized
banks need to issue new equity capital by incurring extra cost a per unit of issued equity,
for certain, to satisfy the requirement. Under this assumption, we calibrate fixed cost
(k), equity issuance cost (a), and the inspection probability before the implementation of
the PCA (p0) by targeting the bank default rate, capital surpluses before and after the
implementation of the PCA, respectively. Tables 1 and 3 show model parameters and
target moments.
2.3.3. Banks’ Value Functions and Policy Functions Figures 3 to 7 illustrate the
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change in bank value functions and policy functions for capital ratio, dividends, and loans,
with the strengthening of surveillance pressure, that is, the inspection probability increases
from p0 = 0.26 (solid lines before) to p1 = 1 (dashed lines after). There are two state
variables, namely, the ex-post equity capital et (i.e., equity capital at the end of period t),
and the credit shock zt. Hence, value functions and policy functions are functions of these
two state variables. We discretize credit shocks zt into 11 states (z1,z2,....,z11). z1 is the
worst (smallest) credit shock and z11 is the best (largest) credit shock. We report only the
relevant values and policy functions in those states.
Figure 3 demonstrates that banks’ value decreases after inspection probability increases.
This reduction is larger for banks with better credit shocks (z9 and z11) and smaller equity
capital. For highly profitable and/or leveraged banks, the capital requirement is more
binding than that for other banks; hence, strengthening the surveillance pressure damages
the value of such banks more seriously than it does others. We can interpret banks’ value as
their charter value, or market value of capital. This implies that strengthening regulatory
surveillance would damage banks’ charter value and increase their default incentives, which
can lead to financial instability, as shown later in subsection 2.4.
Figure 4 reports bank default policies. Banks with the best credit shocks (z11) never
choose to default because they have significant charter value (as Figure 3 shows, their
charter value is greater than zero in all region of equity et). As for banks with relatively bad
shocks (z1, z9) and smaller equity capital, their default thresholds for equity capital increase;
therefore, they are more likely to default when the inspection probability increases, that is,
after the strengthening of surveillance pressure, their charter value decreases (see Figure
3), so that their default incentives increase. Consequently, the banking sector becomes
temporarily vulnerable.
Figure 5 shows bank decisions for capital ratio. Banks with relatively good credit shocks
(z6 and z11) tend to violate capital requirements when the inspection probability is low (p0).
They start to hold the minimum level of capital ratio required (i.e., φ = 0.08) after the
inspection probability increases. Banks with the best credit shocks (z11) and insufficient
equity (e) keep violating the capital requirement, even after the inspection probability
increases. This is because they have such large profitability that they expect high profits,
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and only issue equity ex-post after the regulatory inspection at the expense of some of those
profits, rather than increase capital ratio through costly equity issuance ex-ante before the
regulatory inspection.11 For banks with the worst credit shocks (z1), capital requirements
are not binding, even if the inspection probability is low (p0). Such banks hardly change
their capital policy, even if the inspection probability increases, because they have already
accumulated sufficient capital buffers.
Figure 6 reports dividend policies. Negative dividends mean equity issuance. When
the inspection probability is low (p0), banks with the best credit shocks (z11) and sufficient
equity capital (e) are more likely to allot their profits as dividends; consequently, they are
more likely to violate the capital requirement in incomplete enforcement of regulations,
as Figure 5 shows. However, after the inspection probability increases, they retain their
profits and accumulate their capital buffers, which correspond with the expansion of the
plateau region in Figure 6. After they accumulate sufficient capital buffers so as not to
violate the capital requirement, they start to pay their dividends again.
Figure 7 demonstrates the changes in banks’ lending policies when the inspection prob-
ability increases. Banks with better credit shocks (z9 and z11) and smaller equity capital
(e) contract their credit supplies more substantially than do other banks. This is because,
for those highly profitable and/or leveraged banks, capital requirements are more likely to
be binding, and it is less costly for them to reduce their ex-ante credit supply rather than
to issue new equity capital ex-post after the regulatory inspection.12 Banks with the worst
credit shocks (z1) hardly change their credit supply because they have already accumulated
sufficient equity capital.
2.3.4. Stationary Distribution of Capital Ratio Figure 8 shows stationary distri-
bution of capital ratio, when the regulatory capital surveillance is incompletely enforced
(p = p0(= 0.26)) and completely enforced (p = p1(= 1)), respectively. As the inspection
probability is low (p = p0), many banks choose not to comply with the capital regulation
(φ = 0.08). After increasing the inspection probability (p = p1(= 1)), almost all banks
11 However, as Figure 8 shows, the proportion of banks that violate the capital requirement is small in
equilibrium, in particular, after strengthening capital surveillance.
12 Note that the equity raising policy of highly profitable and/or leveraged banks is almost unchanged
before and after the inspection probability increases, as Figure 5 shows.
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satisfy the capital regulation by accumulating profits.
2.4. Dynamic Analysis from Incomplete to Complete Enforcement We now
turn to the dynamic analysis from incomplete to complete enforcement of capital regula-
tion, in which the inspection probability increases from p0(= 0.26) to p1(= 1). Our dynamic
analysis examines the development of aggregate variables (such as the total amount of loans,
default rate of banks, and capital ratio) over time, after the inspection probability increases
from p0 to p1. We assume that initially the economy is at the stationary equilibrium of
p0 (i.e., the incomplete enforcement of the capital regulation). The probability increases
to p1(= 1) (i.e., the complete enforcement of capital regulation) unexpectedly, at the in-
termediate stage of period t = 10, that is, the announcement of the complete enforcement
of capital regulation occurs before banks decide on whether to default or not at t = 10.
Figure 9 reports the results.
Following the increase in inspection probability, banks accumulate capital buffers, as
panel (a) shows. As external equity issuance is costly, banks gradually accumulate profits
and increase their capital ratio over time.
As panel (b) shows, banks cut dividends in response to the increase in inspection proba-
bility. Dividend distribution recovers gradually; however, it does not return to the original
level, as banks are forced secure a larger proportion of their profits than before the strength-
ening of capital regulation.
Bank franchise value (panel (c)) and market capital ratio (panel (d)) appear to move
in the same way as their dividends.13 In contrast to the regulatory capital buffer, market
capital ratio decreases following the increase in inspection probability. This contrast in
movement between the regulatory and the market capital ratio (or the franchise value)
demonstrates the impacts of strengthening capital regulation, as observed in Figure 1 for
the PCA program in Japan. The regulatory capital ratio drastically increased in FY 1997
when the PCA went into preliminary implementation; however, the market value of bank
capital decreased. This indicates that banks managed to increase their regulatory capital
ratio by retaining their earnings after the strengthening of capital supervision, while they
13 The market capital ratio is franchise value / (franchise value + deposit).
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faced increases in their default risk (panel (e)), which is governed by their market value.
Sarin and Summers (2016) highlight this effect for U.S. financial institutions (see also Begley
et al. (2017)).14
We can confirm this by the dynamics in banks’ default decisions (shown in panel (e)).
The banking sector initially becomes unstable, as the franchise value of banks decreases;
thus, they are more likely to choose default just after the inspection probability increases.
However, in the long run, banks are less likely to default, and thus, the overall banking
system becomes more stable than the initial steady state, as the charter value of banks
recovers gradually (albeit it does not return to its original level) in tandem with the gradual
increase in regulatory capital. Precisely, the default rate in the steady state decreases from
about 0.94% to about 0.87%. Therefore, our dynamic model has different implications
about the strengthening regulatory surveillance in stabilizing the banking system from the
short- and long-run perspectives.15
The dynamic response of credit supply (panel (f)) indicates that after inspection proba-
bility increases, banks suddenly reduce loans; a capital crunch occurs. The amount of loans
appear to recover gradually, with the gradual increase in bank regulatory capital buffers;
however, the amount of loans does not return to the original level, as the funding costs of
banks now become larger in equating the marginal profits of loans with the marginal costs
of funding.
2.5. Theoretical Predictions and Empirical Insights Based on the results for cal-
ibration thus far, and to motivate our empirical analysis in the next section, we now sum-
marize some empirical insights on the causal impacts of strengthening capital supervision
14 Sarin and Summers (2016) discussed the capitalization of U.S. financial institutions as “...regulatory
measures that have increased safety have been offset by a dramatic decline in the franchise value of major
financial institutions, caused at least in part by these new (stricter) regulations.” Begley et al. (2017)
empirically showed that U.S. banks under-report their risk in their trading books when they have lower
equity capital.
15 Compared with the U.S. banking system, the Japanese banking system has experienced very few
bank failures. However, just before and after the preliminary implementation of the PCA in FY 1997,
bank failures temporarily increased. From FYs 1996 to 1999, 14 Japanese banks including the Hokkaido
Takushoku Bank and the Long-Term Credit Bank of Japan failed (the annual default rate is about 2%),
whereas after FY 2000, only four banks including the Ashikaga bank failed (the annual defaut rate is about
0.1%).
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on bank behavior. 1) Highly profitable and/or leveraged banks, in the short run, are more
likely to respond to the strengthening of capital regulation. Their charter value and lend-
ing will decrease more than other banks, while all banks accumulate regulatory capital
and decrease charter value and lending, 2) however, in the long run, such accumulation of
regulatory capital leads to the stability of the overall banking system. In the next section,
we focus on short-run implications, empirically examining the impacts of strengthening
capital supervision.
3. Empirical Design We begin by reviewing the prompt corrective action (PCA) pro-
gram in Japan to utilize the PCA as a natural experiment to test our theoretical predictions
about the causal impacts of strengthening bank capital supervision on bank behavior. We
then introduce empirical specifications for the following bank outcome variables: regulatory
capital ratios, franchise values, and bank loans.
3.1. PCA in Japan: Increase in Regulatory Pressure in FY 1997 We now review
the PCA program in Japan for the empirical analyses in the following sections.
The Japanese authorities established the PCA framework under the “Law to Ensure
Financial Institution Soundness,” loosely modeled after the U.S. framework (see Kanaya
and Woo (2000). For the enforcement of the PCA in the U.S., see Jones and King (1995).
The PCA, which was to take full effect in April 1998, went into preliminary implementation
in FY 1997. The PCA has two main components.
First, it introduces a self-assessment process that holds the banks responsible for valuing
their assets prudently and realistically, according to well-defined guidelines. These proce-
dures also require that the banks’ own findings (including the necessary provisioning for
loan losses and capital ratios) be subject to review by external auditors and inspection and
monitoring by bank examiners.
Second, the PCA also specifies the thresholds of the regulatory capital ratio under
which the regulators can force the banks to take remedial actions. These remedial actions
range from reduction of branches to reduction of dividends and liquidation in the case of
insolvency. In addition, in FY 1997, the authorities announced that the Financial Super-
visory Agency (FSA) would take over the role of banking supervision from the Ministry
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of Finance. The FSA was granted autonomy and independence to allow its supervisors to
operate more effectively. The FSA started operations in April 1998.
By removing the possibility of discretionary forbearance of bank supervisors, the PCA
represented a strengthening of the existing regulatory framework at the time.16 Taking
these facts into account, we regard the PCA as an “ex-ante” capital regulation before
violating the capital requirement (see also footnote 1 in the Introduction). Indeed, as Woo
(2003), Watanabe (2007), and Sekine and Watanabe (2018) emphasize, combined with the
creation of the FSA, whose independence gave it a credibility that the Ministry of Finance
lacked, the preliminary implementation of the PCA could force the weakly capitalized banks
to take the capital adequacy requirement more seriously; consequently, it could trigger a
credit crunch by these banks in FY 1997.
3.2. Empirical Specification As discussed in the above subsection, previous literature
noted that the preliminary implementation of the PCA in FY 1997 increased regulatory
pressure on Japanese banks. Based on the short-run implications of our dynamic model
(see subsection 2.5), we empirically address the following three questions:
1. Did the heightened regulatory pressure in FY 1997 lead to an increase in banks’
regulatory capital? If yes, did the capital increase depend on banks’ holding of
regulatory capital and profitability in the pre-1997 period, or FY 1996?
2. Did the heightened regulatory pressure decrease banks’ franchise values? Further-
more, as our dynamic model predicts, did low capitalized and/or profitable banks
face higher reduction in franchise values?
3. Did the heightened regulatory pressure reduce bank lending? Furthermore, as our
16 Kanaya and Woo (2000) provide evidence of regulatory forbearance, made possible by the weakness in
the regulatory framework before FY 1997. For example, the regulatory authorities, which had the power
to de-license banks, usually intervened only after banks had become insolvent. Furthermore, as shown by
Skinner (2008), Japanese banks also used deferred tax assets to compensate for capital losses arising from
unrealized losses on their stock holdings. They were able to do so because the government allowed them to
account for their deferred tax assets as Tier I capital in 1998. Bank managers subjectively estimated their
total deferred tax assets at their own discretion. The regulatory forbearance policy had allowed Japanese
banks to engage in a “patching up” of their capital ratios before FY 1997 (see also Shrieves and Dahl
(2003) and Nakashima and Takahashi (2018)).
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dynamic model predicts, did low capitalized and/or profitable banks face higher re-
duction in bank lending?
To examine the causal impacts of the heightened regulatory pressure in FY 1997, we
use the following specification with two-way fixed effects for bank-level panel data,
yit = a0 + a1BUFFERit−1 + a2ROAit−1 + a3BUFFERit−1 ∗ ROAit−1
+ a4tFY 1997 + a5BUFFERit−1 ∗ tFY 1997 + a6ROA ∗ tFY 1997 (18)
+ a6BUFFERit−1 ∗ ROAit−1 ∗ tFY 1997 + a7CONTROLSit−1 + vi + εit,
where the dependent variable, yit, indicates bank i’s four outcome variables for the two
sample periods t = FYs 1996 and 1997, that is, regulatory capital adequacy ratios, reg-
ulatory capital buffers, market capital ratios, and the growth rate of the total amount of
loans outstanding. Regulatory capital buffers are defined as the difference between a bank’s
reported capital adequacy ratios and its regulatory target ratio (8% for international banks
and 4% for domestic banks). We use the bank market capital ratio as a proxy of bank
franchise values. The bank market capital ratio is defined as the market value of a bank’s
equity divided by the market value of its total assets, where the market value of a bank’s
total assets is defined as the sum of the market value of its equity and the book value of
its total liabilities. We calculate the market value of equity by multiplying the end-of-year
stock price by the number of shares.
Observable explanatory variables, BUFFERit−1 and ROAit−1, denote one-period-lagged
values of the regulatory capital buffers and return on assets for bank i, respectively. These
two variables are supposed to capture the adequacy of bank capital and profitability in the
pre-1997 period, or FY 1996. CONTROLSit−1 denote one-period-lagged values of other con-
trol variables: logarithmic values of total assets SIZEit−1, the indicator variable regarding
whether bank i has overseas branches OVERSEAit−1, and Tobin’s q TOBINQit−1. Tobin’s
q is defined as the ratio of the market value of bank i to its book value, where the market
value is defined as the sum of the market value of its equity and the book value of its total
liabilities. µi denotes bank i’s time-invariant fixed effects and t indicates time dummies.
εit is the stochastic disturbance term.
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As for using the bank-firm loan-level matched data, we introduce the following specifi-
cation with the three-way fixed effects for the bank loan equation,
∆LOANjit = a0 + a1BUFFERit−1 + a2ROAit−1 + a3BUFFERit−1 ∗ ROAit−1
+ a4BUFFERit−1 ∗ tFY 1997 + a5ROA ∗ tFY 1997
+ a6BUFFERit−1 ∗ ROAit−1 ∗ tFY 1997 + a7CONTROLSit−1
+ a8RELATIONS
j
it−1 + vi + ujt + ε
j
it, (19)
where the dependent variable, ∆LOANjit, indicates the growth rate of the total amount of
loans outstanding between bank i and domestic listed firm j for the two sample periods
t = FYs 1996 to 1997.
The loan-level equation (19) additionally includes as control variables one-period lags
of two relationship variables RELATIONSjit−1: lending exposure LEXP
j
it−1 and borrowing
exposure BEXPjit−1. The lending exposure is defined as loans from bank i to firm j divided
by the total loans of bank i. The borrowing exposure is defined in the same manner, as
loans from bank i to firm j divided by the total borrowings of firm j. vi denotes bank i’s
time-invariant fixed effects to control for its time-invariant unobservables, while ujt denotes
firm j’s time-varying fixed effects, or YEARt ∗ uj with time dummies (YEARt), to control
for the borrowing firm’s total demand factors at each sample period t. εjit is the stochastic
disturbance term.
Again note that to control for borrower-side factors in the bank loan equation (19)
with ujt, we employ the fixed-effects approach proposed by Khwaja and Mian (2008) and
Jime´nez et al. (2012; 2014). The fixed-effects approach allows us to assumes that all
potential borrower-side factors are embodied in time-varying firm unobservables, which are
captured by time*firm fixed effects (ujt).
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Equations (18) and (19) capture the causal impact of the preliminary implementation
of the PCA in FY 1997 on each bank outcome variable, whose magnitude should depend on
17 Hosono and Miyakawa (2014), Nakashima (2016), and Nakashima et al. (2020) employed this fixed-
effects approach with Japanese loan-level matched data. Nakashima (2016) examined the effects of Japan’s
public capital injections on bank lending, while Hosono and Miyakawa (2014) and Nakashima et al. (2020)
identified the effects of unconventional monetary policies on bank loan supply.
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bank capitalization and profitability; the magnitude should be larger for highly leveraged
and/or highly profitable banks, according to our theoretical prediction. Our empirical
approach assumes that such a marginal impact with respect to the marginal change in
bank capitalization and profitability should be observed only in FY 1997.18
3.3. Estimation Method To estimate bank-level equation (18) with two-way fixed
effects, we employ the conventional within estimation method for bank panel data of the
sample period t = FYs 1996 and 1997.
For estimating the bank loan equation (19) with the three-way fixed-effects, our matched
lender–borrower sample is based on a continuation of the lending relationship. According
to the literature on relationship banking, the continuation of a bank–firm relationship
depends on both the bank’s and the firm’s characteristics (Ongena and Smith (2001) and
Nakashima and Takahashi (2020)). In other words, we must address the survivorship bias
that may arise from non-random assortative matching between banks and firms. To correct
for survivorship bias, we employ Heckman’s (1979) two-stage regression technique. In the
first stage, we conduct a probit regression of relationship survival. Then, in the second
stage, we employ the estimate method developed by Abowd et al. (1999) and Andrews et
al. (2008) for the regression of the difference-in-difference specification of the bank loan
equation (19) with the three-way fixed-effects.19
Our probit regression includes one-period lags of four banks’ characteristics such as the
market leverage ratio, six firms’ characteristics such as the interest coverage ratio, and three
relationship factors such as the duration of the relationship between lender i and borrowing
firm j. We estimate the probit regression for the continuation of bank–firm relationships
and then estimate the second-stage regression of the bank lending equation with the inverse
Mills ratio. To take into account the possibility that the coefficients of the variables in the
probit model are time-varying, as noted by Nakashima and Takahashi (2020), we conduct
18 Our empirical specifications (18) and (19) are variants of the difference-in-difference specification with
continuous treatment variables. Therefore, the estimated coefficients on the interaction terms of bank
capital and ROA with the time dummy of FY 1997 can be interpreted as marginal treatment effects.
Acemoglu et al. (2004) and Estevadeordal and Taylor (2013) adopt a similar approach.
19 This estimation method gives consistent and unbiased parameter estimates, not only for time-varying
observables, but also for unobserved fixed effects. See Abowd et al. (1999) and Andrews et al. (2008) for
more details.
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estimate the probit model year by year, that is, t = FYs 1996 and 1997. The Appendix
contains the details of the estimation results.
3.4. Dataset Our data come from two sources. We obtain bank-level panel data from
Nikkei Digital Media Inc. The data are annual and based on financial statements reported
by Japanese banks for the full year (ending in March of calendar year t+ 1) of their fiscal
year (FY) t, with our regression samples covering the period from FY 1996 to FY 1997.
For our analysis, we include loans from Japanese city, trust, regional and mutual banks.
The sample size for our analysis is 232 with 116 Japanese banks listed on any Japanese
stock exchange. Table A-1 provides summary statistics for our bank-level panel data.
The second source of data is matched bank-firm loan data from the Corporate Bor-
rowings from the Financial Institutions Database compiled by Nikkei Digital Media Inc.
The data are annual and report short-term loans (with a maturity of one year or less) and
long-term ones (with a maturity of more than one year) from each financial institution for
every listed company on any Japanese stock exchange, which we sum to obtain the total
amount of loans outstanding. Our loan measure comprises all loans received from each
financial institution for about 2,500 firms per year. When combining the bank-level panel
data, we use the fiscal year-end reports by banks on March 31.
The challenge of working with loan-level data was sorting through bank mergers and re-
structuring in our data. We recorded all dates of bankruptcies and mergers in the Japanese
banking sector. In our data, when a bank ceases to exist because of a bankruptcy, firms
cease reporting that financial institution as a source of loans. If we could not find any
information on a bankruptcy or merger, we filled in the zero loan data. However, if we
found evidence of a bankruptcy or a merger, and firms reported loans coming from a re-
structured bank as coming from the prior bank, we recoded these loans as coming from the
restructured bank. To calculate the loan growth of a restructured bank, we trace all the
banks that predated it. Thus, if banks A and B merged in year t to form bank C, bank
C’s loans in year t − 1 would be set equal to the sum of the loans of banks A and B, and
the growth rate of bank C’s loans in year t would be calculated accordingly.
The loan-level data cover about 110 banks, about 2,500 listed firms, and about 20,000
relations per year. Our data set does not include all SMEs but covers approximately 70% of
21
the total loans of the Japanese banking sector for our sample period from FY 1996 through
FY 1997. The number of observations is 42,907. Table A-2 provides summary statistics for
our loan-level matched data.
4. Empirical Results We now report the estimation results for regressions (18) and
(19). We then conduct a placebo test for other sample periods before the preliminary
implementation of the PCA in FY 1997.
4.1. Estimation Results The left panel of table 4 reports results for the causal im-
pacts on banks’ regulatory capital building. tFY 1997 has significantly positive coefficients,
indicating that the preliminary implementation of the PCA in FY 1997, or the increasing
regulatory capital pressure in FY 1997, resulted in Japanese banks’ building regulatory
capital, as also observed in Table 2. This result does not depend on the use of the level
(the left column) and the buffer of regulatory capital (the right column) as the outcome
variable. Note that the interaction term, BUFFERit−1 ∗ tFY 1997, has significantly nega-
tive coefficients, implying that highly leveraged banks—banks with low regulatory capital
ratios—were more likely to engage in capital building with increasing regulatory capital
pressure in FY 1997.
The middle panel of Table 4 shows estimated impacts on banks’ market capital ratios,
which is a proxy of banks’ franchise value. tFY 1997 has a significantly negative coefficient.
This implies that the preliminary implementation of the PCA in FY 1997 drove down
the franchise value of banks. In addition, BUFFERit−1 ∗ tFY 1997 has a positive coefficient,
ROAit−1 ∗ tFY 1997 has a negative coefficient, and BUFFERit−1 ∗ ROAit−1 ∗ tFY 1997 has a
positive coefficient, indicating that high leveraged and/or profitable banks were more likely
to face a decrease in their franchise value. These results for banks’ market capital ratios
are consistent with our theoretical prediction.
The right panel of Table 4 reports estimated impacts on bank lending behavior obtained
using the bank-level specification (the left column) and the loan-level specification (the right
column). In the bank-level specification, tFY 1997 has a significantly negative coefficient.
This implies that the preliminary implementation of the PCA in FY 1997, or the increasing
regulatory capital pressure, reduced bank credit. Furthermore, BUFFERit−1 ∗ tFY 1997 has a
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positive coefficient, ROAit−1∗tFY 1997 has a negative coefficient, and BUFFERit−1∗ROAit−1∗
tFY 1997 has a positive coefficient, indicating that highly leveraged and/or profitable banks
were more likely to cut their credit in the increasing regulatory capital pressure in FY
1997. Also note that BUFFERit−1 ∗ ROAit−1 has a negative coefficient, which implies that
highly leveraged-profitable banks were more likely to lend in FY 1996 before the increase
in regulatory pressure; however, the increasing regulatory pressure in the PCA has a more
substantially negative impact on lending by such high leveraged-profitable banks.
Summing up our empirical results, the preliminary implementation of the PCA in
FY1997, or the increasing regulatory capital pressure in Japan, decreased the lending and
charter value of highly leveraged and/or profitable banks more substantially than other
banks, albeit increasing the regulatory capital and decreasing the charter value and loans
of all banks, consistent with our theoretical predictions.20
4.2. Robustness Check with Placebo Tests Thus far, our empirical approach re-
lies on the assumption that the difference in each bank outcome variable—the regulatory
capital, franchise values, and bank loans—with respect to the marginal difference in bank
capitalization and profitability arises from the preliminary implementation of the PCA in
FY 1997. In other words, the marginal difference in bank capitalization and profitability
should not have any effects on the bank outcome variables in other sample periods. To
show the robustness of our result, we conduct a placebo test, that is, we run regressions
(18)-(19) using different sample periods before FY 1997, and thereby, demonstrate that the
difference in the bank outcome variables occurs only before and after the PCA in FY 1997.
Table 5 shows the estimation results for the other sample periods, FYs 1993 through
1996, indicating that not only the time dummies (tFY 1993, tFY 1994, tFY 1995, and tFY 1996),
but also the interaction terms of the regulatory capital buffers (BUFFERit−1) and return
on assets (ROAit−1) with the time dummies do not have significant coefficients in many
cases. Furthermore, even significant coefficients of the interaction terms do not support our
20 The Japanese government administered the first public capital injections into the Japanese banking
sector in March 1998 for 21 banks (see Nakashima (2016)). We also include the capital injection dummies
into equations (18) and (19), thereby, conducting robustness checks on our estimation results. We found
that even if we include the capital injection dummy, our estimation results did not qualitatively change.
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theoretical predictions.21 This implies that the marginal difference in bank capitalization
and profitability before and after FY 1997 successfully captures the marginal effects of
the preliminary implementation of the PCA. Therefore, in other periods, when the PCA
is irrelevant, bank attributes involved with their capitalization and profitability have no
marginal impacts on their behavior in a theoretically consistent manner.
5. Conclusion This study examines the impact of strengthening bank capital surveil-
lance on bank heterogeneity in lending, capital accumulation, charter value, and default
decisions. To this end, we employ the traditional analytical framework of the incomplete
and complete enforcement of regulations, by modeling the degree of efforts of financial
agency to inspect and detect whether banks violate the regulator capital requirement, as
the probability of inspection on bank capital ratio. In a dynamic model of banks facing
idiosyncratic credit quality shocks, highly leveraged and/or profitable banks, in the short
run, are more likely to respond to the strengthening of capital surveillance. They decrease
charter value (i.e., market value of capital) and lending more than low leveraged and/or
profitable banks, while all banks accumulate regulatory capital and decrease charter value
and lending. By contrast, in the long run, the gradual accumulation of regulatory capital
leads to the stability of the overall banking system.
To test the short-run implications of our model, as a natural experiment, we utilize
the introduction of the prompt corrective action (PCA) program in Japan, which went
into preliminary implementation in FY 1997—took full effect in April 1998—and requested
banks to self-assess their assets rigorously. Using some empirical models with bank- and
loan-level data, we find that the PCA decreased the lending and charter value of high
leveraged and/or profitable banks more substantially than other banks, albeit increasing
the regulatory capital and decreasing the loan supply of all banks. This empirical result is
21 Before Article 26 of the Banking Act was revised in FY 1996, a Japanese bank was allowed to select the
international standard on capital adequacy of 8%, even though it did not have overseas branches. After the
revision, a Japanese bank that did not have overseas branches was forced to adopt the domestic standard
of 4%. For a robustness check on our estimation results, we also include a switching dummy, indicating
whether a bank switched the international standard on capital adequacy to the domestic one after the
revision in FY 1996, and thus, increased its capital buffers by 4%. Coefficients on the switching indicator
are estimated to be significant in FY 1996, while estimation results are not qualitatively different from
those reported in Table 5.
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consistent with our theoretical predictions.
Through the above theoretical and empirical analysis, we now confirm the observation
of Sarin and Summers (2016) and as Figure 1 shows, in the case of PCA in Japan that from
the short-run perspective, stricter capital regulation increases regulatory capital; however,
it can decrease banks’ franchise value, which may lead to financial instability. Therefore,
at least in terms of this short-run consequence, we agree with Sarin and Summers’ (2016)
criticism, “regulatory measures of capital (after tightening capital regulation) are flawed.”
However, our dynamic analysis provides an alternative insight into bank behavior and
the stability of banking system after the complete enforcement of capital regulation. The
resultant short-run coexistence of the increase in regulatory capital and the decrease in
banks’ franchise value and lending would be followed by the long-run consequence in the
form of decrease in banks’ default risk and a more stable banking system. This insight may
have important implications for regulatory policy.
Appendix: Estimation Results for Relation Survival Probability In subsection
3.3, we included the inverse Mills ratio in the bank loan model to control for survival bias.
In this Appendix, we present the estimation results of the probit model, which is used to
calculate the inverse Mills ratio.
The literature on relationship banking states that the continuation of a bank–firm re-
lationship depends on the characteristics of both. Our probit regression includes one-
period lags of banks’ market leverage ratio (MARCAP it−1), return on assets (BROAit−1),
size (BSIZEit−1), and the number of firms that have lending–borrowing relationships with
bank i (NUMBBit−1). Firm characteristics include one-period lags of firms’ book leverage
ratio (FBLEVjt−1), return on assets (FROAjt−1), interest coverage ratio (FICRjt−1), size
(FSIZEjt−1), and the number of banks that have relationships with firm j (NUMBFjt−1).
To control for the firm-level attributes, we also include dummy variables for the industries
to which firms belong. In addition to the bank–firm characteristics, our probit regression
includes one-period lags of bank i’s lending exposure to firm j (LEXPjit−1), firm j’s borrow-
ing exposure to bank i (BEXPjit−1), and the duration of the relationship between lender i
and borrowing firm j (DURATjit−1) as relationship factors. We conduct rolling estimation
of the probit model year-by-year to incorporate time-varying effects of each variable. This
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year-by-year estimation means that we do not need to include time dummies.
Table A-3 shows the estimation results and indicates that higher borrowing and lend-
ing exposure and longer duration of relationships are associated with a higher probability
of continuation of relationships. Furthermore, firms with higher profitability tend to con-
tinue their relationships with lending banks. A lower firm’s interest coverage ratio implies
a higher probability of continuation of the relationship, which suggests that firms with
high dependence on debt funding tend to continue their relationships with banks. Notably,
higher bank leverage was associated with a lower probability of the continuation of relation-
ships in the late 1990s. This suggests that in the late 1990s, a capital crunch occurred in
terms of relationship termination, as noted by Nakashima and Takahashi (2020). Overall,
dependence on debt finance, higher firm profitability, and higher borrowing and lending
exposure are associated with higher probability of relationship continuation.
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Table 1: Model Parameters
Parameter Value Target (Source)
Deposit Rate Rd 0 DeNicolo et al. (2014)
Discount Factor of Bankers β 0.95 Cost of Bank Capital 5% (DeNicolo et al. (2014))
Revenue Function of Loans f(x) x0.9 DeNicolo et al. (2014)
Capital Requirement φ 0.08 Basel Accords
Persistency of i.d. Shock ρ 0.76 Panel Data on ROA (FYs 1975-1996)
Std. Dev. of i.d. Shock σ 0.15 panel data on ROA (FYs 1975-1996)
Mean of i.d. Shock log z 0.27 Panel Data on ROA (FYs 1975-1996)
Fixed Cost k 1.02 Annual Bank’s Default Rate 1%
Equity Issuance Cost a 0.40 Capital Surplus after PCA 4%
Inspection Prob. before PCA p0 0.26 Capital Surplus before PCA 1%
Inspection Prob. after PCA p1 1 Assumption (complete enforcement)
Notes: This table reports the parameter values for our calibration. The middle panel shows
estimation results for equation (17) introduced in subsection 2.3.1.
Table 2: Summary of Capital Surplus
(Capital Ratio minus the Required Level)
Fiscal Year Mean (%) Number of Banks
1994 .91079137 139
1995 1.1691304 138
1996 .97183823 136
1997 3.142406 133
1998 3.391 130
1999 4.4944776 134
2000 4.0996297 135
Notes: This table reports the sample average of the regulatory capital buffer calculated in each
fiscal year.
Table 3: Model and Target Moments
Moment Target Model
Default Rate of Banks (%) 1 0.93
Capital Surplus after PCA (%) 4 3.2
Capital Surplus before PCA (%) 1 0.87
Notes: This table reports the targeted values of the default rate, and those of the capital surplus
before and after the preliminary implementation of Japan’s prompt corrective action (PCA)
program in FY 1997.
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Table 4: Estimated Impacts of the PCA on Regulatory Capital, Market
Capital Ratio, and Bank Lending
Regulatory Cap. Market Cap. Bank Lending
Level Buffer Ratio Bank Level Loan Level
BUFFERit−1 0.257 0.123 0.230 -0.856 -0.922
(0.188) (0.331) (0.145) (0.625) (0.616)
ROAit−1 -0.614 -0.260 0.207 -0.655 -0.325
(0.506) (0.893) (0.388) (1.629) (1.262)
BUFFERit−1 ∗ ROAit−1 0.764** 0.123 -0.339 -2.529** -3.490***
(0.346) (0.289) (0.258) (1.108) (0.810)
tFY1997 1.253*** 2.674*** -0.452*** -0.503**
(0.190) (0.335) (0.147) (0.232)
BUFFERit−1 ∗ tFY1997 -0.321*** -0.450** 0.251*** 0.464 0.810**
(0.119) (0.210) (0.093) (0.400) (0.405)
ROAit−1 ∗ tFY1997 -0.585 0.670 -0.719* -3.148* -3.354***
(0.576) (1.017) (0.376) (1.885) (1.012)
BUFFERit−1 ∗ ROAit−1 ∗ tFY1997 -0.586 0.670 0.543* 2.816*** 3.232***
(0.576) (1.017) (0.237) (1.017) (0.682)
SIZEit−1 3.523 3.957 1.359 17.28 11.66**
(3.450) (6.084) (2.584) (11.08) (2.415)
OVERSEAit−1 -0.485 -0.436 0.356 -0.303 3.000
(0.788) (1.390) (0.612) (2.628) (3.162)
TOBINQit−1 0.056 0.223* 0249* 1.130*** 2.844***
(0.073) (0.129) (0.057) (0.247) (0.100)
LEXPjit−1 -0.064
(0.090)
BEXPjit−1 0.078***
(0.012)
Inverse Mills Ratiojit -0.801***
(0.142)
Constant -50.81 -81.10 -41.58 -372.8*** -221.4*
(54.40) (95.93) (40.93) (175.4) (111.4)
Bank Fix. Eff. yes yes yes yes yes
Firm-Year Fix. Eff. yes
Obs. 232 232 232 232 42907
Notes: This table shows the results of regressions (18) and (19) to examine the impacts of the
preliminary implementation of the prompt corrective action (PCA) program in FY 1997 on the
regulatory capital, market capital ratio, and bank lending. ***, **, * indicate 1%, 5%, and 10%
levels of significance, respectively. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
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Table 5: Placebo Test for FYs 1993, 1994, 1995 and 1996
Fiscal Year 1993 Buffer Market Cap. Ratio Lending: Bank Level Lending: Loan Level
tFY1993 0.152 0.223 -0.302
(0.137) (0.389) (0.232)
BUFFERit−1 ∗ tFY1993 0.251* -0.450 0.404 0.291
(0.133) (0.300) (0.400) (0.309)
ROAit−1 ∗ tFY1993 -0.700 0.671 -2.238 -2.230
(0.676) (1.100) (1.985) (2.012)
BUFFERit−1 ∗ ROAit−1 ∗ tFY1993 0.543 0.670 1.200 -2.232**
(0.437) (1.017) (1.017) (1.022)
obs. 256 256 256 43209
Fiscal Year 1994 Buffer Market Cap. Ratio Lending: Bank Level Lending: Loan Level
tFY1994 0.025 0.023 -0.230
(0.074) (0.089) (0.232)
BUFFERit−1 ∗ tFY1994 0.121 -0.450 0.404 0.501
(0.093) (0.310) (0.400) (0.405)
ROAit−1 ∗ tFY1994 0.591 0.670** 3.380** 3.289
(0.672) (0.317) (1.885) (3.012)
BUFFERit−1 ∗ ROAit−1 ∗ tFY1994 0.243 -0.570 1.162 2.847
(0.237) (0.617) (1.017) (2.682)
obs. 252 252 252 42959
Fiscal Year 1995 Buffer Market Cap. Ratio Lending: Bank Level Lending: Loan Level
tFY1995 0.222 -0.123 -0.133
(0.265) (0.096) (0.272)
BUFFERit−1 ∗ tFY1995 0.121* -0.205 0.511 0.810
(0.066) (0.220) (0.409) (0.805)
ROAit−1 ∗ tFY1995 -0.119 0.690 -3.138 -3.354
(0.376) (0.917) (2.972) (3.012)
BUFFERit−1 ∗ ROAit−1 ∗ tFY1995 0.321 0.870 1.861 2.277
(0.221) (1.211) (1.471) (1.682)
obs. 248 248 248 46843
Fiscal Year 1996 Buffer Market Cap. Ratio Lending: Bank Level Lending: Loan Level
tFY1996 0.221 -0.523*** -0.118
(0.247) (0.189) (0.232)
BUFFERit−1 ∗ tFY1996 0.112 0.250* 0.242 0.215
(0.093) (0.137) (0.319) (0.274)
ROAit−1 ∗ tFY1996 0.319 0.7840 -2.388 -3.493
(0.335) (1.259) (2.885) (3.265)
BUFFERit−1 ∗ ROAit−1 ∗ tFY1996 0.243 0.470 1.366 2.972
(0.237) (0.871) (2.692) (2.682)
obs. 238 238 238 47832
Notes: This table shows only estimated coefficients of the time dummies of FYs 1993-1996 and
their interaction terms with banks’ capital buffer and ROA for regressions (18) and (19), obtained
using sample periods before the prompt corrective action (PCA) program in FY 1997. ***, **,
* indicate 1%, 5%, and 10% levels of significance, respectively. Robust standard errors are in
parentheses.
32
Table A-1: Summary Statistics for Bank-level Data:
Fiscal Years 1996 - 1997
Variables
Total Sample Fiscal Year 1996 Fiscal Year 1997
Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Regulatory Capital Ratioit 232 8.235 2.373 0.660 13.61 116 7.826 2.568 2.850 13.61 116 8.648 2.092 0.660 13.56
Outcome BUFFERit 232 2.092 1.914 -5.010 9.480 116 1.070 1.145 -5.010 5.610 116 3.123 1.983 -3.340 9.480
Variables
Market Capital Ratioit 232 4.595 1.966 0.010 13.98 116 4.810 1.900 0.745 10.71 116 4.037 2.015 0.011 13.98
∆LOANit 232 0.050 0.044 -0.298 0.235 116 0.062 0.042 -0.297 0.235 116 0.038 0.045 -0.184 0.123
ROAit−1 232 -0.137 1.078 -16.22 0.436 116 -0.058 0.522 -2.186 0.436 116 -0.214 1.427 -16.21 0.262
Control SIZEit−1 232 14.62 1.355 11.94 18.17 116 14.60 1.352 11.94 17.80 116 14.63 1.362 11.98 18.17
Variables
OVERSEAit−1 232 0.982 0.182 0.000 1.000 116 0.100 0.159 0.000 1.000 116 0.091 0.198 0.000 1.000
TOBINQit−1 232 101.9 2.373 97.93 115.2 116 102.5 2.833 98.83 115.2 116 101.3 1.619 97.93 107.9
Notes: See subsection 3.2 for the definition of each variable.
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Table A-2: Summary Statistics for Loan-level Data:
Fiscal Years 1996 - 1997
Variables
Total Sample Fiscal Year 1996 Fiscal Year 1997
Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Dependent Variable ∆LOANjit 42907 0.178 2.252 -0.999 276.2 21453 0.209 1.987 -0.999 100 21454 0.147 2.498 -0.996 276.2
Factor of bank i
BUFFERit−1 42907 1.720 1.544 -5.010 9.480 21453 1.129 1.131 -5.010 5.610 21454 2.332 1.670 -3.340 9.480
ROAit−1 42907 -0.178 0.529 -16.21 0.649 21453 -0.020 0.368 -2.186 0.436 21454 -0.344 0.614 -16.21 0.649
SIZEit−1 42907 16.71 1.275 11.53 18.17 21453 16.67 1.259 11.53 17.95 21454 16.75 1.289 11.98 18.17
OVERSEAit−1 42907 0.173 0.136 0.000 1.000 21453 0.178 0.132 0.000 1.000 21454 0.169 1.40 0.000 1.000
TOBINQit−1 42907 104.0 3.355 97.93 123.8 21453 105.3 3.827 98.76 123.8 21454 102.8 2.230 97.93 123.8
Relationship Factor LEXPjit−1 42907 0.600 2.660 0.000 100.0 21453 0.623 2.724 0.000 92.30 21454 0.578 2.596 0.000 100.0
of lender i and
borrower j BEXPjit−1 42907 10.12 12.80 0.002 100.0 21453 9.698 12.37 0.002 100.0 21454 10.51 13.17 0.003 100.0
Notes: See subsection 3.2 for the definition of each variable.
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Table A-3: Results for the Survivorship Model of Bank–Firm Relationships
Fiscal Year 1996 1997
MARCAPit−1 −0.0590
∗∗∗ −0.0222∗
(−6.03) (−1.69)
BSIZEit−1 0.212
∗∗∗ 0.0997∗∗
(5.16) (2.17)
BROAit−1 0.128
∗∗∗ 0.0539∗∗
(4.97) (2.54)
FLEVjt−1 0.0145
∗∗∗ 0.000600
(5.97) (0.24)
FSIZEjt−1 0.106 0.364
∗∗∗
(1.31) (3.91)
FROAjt−1 0.00908
∗∗∗ 0.00101
(3.34) (0.62)
FICRjt−1 0.00000177
∗∗ −0.000000292
(2.34) (−0.22)
DURAT 0.0127∗∗∗ 0.00977∗∗∗
(7.79) (6.20)
EXPLjit−1 0.000290 0.0732
∗∗∗
(0.05) (6.44)
EXPBjit−1 0.0142
∗∗∗ 0.00871∗∗∗
(12.92) (8.71)
NUMBLit−1 0.299
∗∗∗ 0.231∗∗∗
(9.54) (7.43)
NUMBBjt−1 −0.187
∗∗∗ −0.00246
(−4.35) (−0.05)
N 21453 21454
Notes: This table shows the estimation results of the model with industry fixed effects. The
dependent variable is the survival dummy variable, which equals one if the borrower–lender
relationship continues in year t and zero otherwise. See also the Appendix for details on our
variable definition. We also include five-year moving average values of the firm ROA, interest
coverage ratio, book leverage ratio, and size to control for time-varying firm fixed effects. The
table does not show the estimated coefficients. *, **, and *** denote significance at levels of
0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively. t statistics are in parentheses.
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Figure 1: Bank Market Capital Ratio and Regulatory Capital Surplus
Notes: The solid line shows the sample mean of the market capital ratio calculated as of the end of
March in each year and the dashed line shows the sample mean of the regulatory capital surplus. The
bank market capital ratio is defined as the market value of a bank’s equity divided by the market value
of its total assets, where the market value of a bank’s total assets is defined as the sum of the market
value of its equity and the book value of its total liabilities. The regulatory capital surplus is defined
as the difference between a bank’s reported regulatory capital ratio and its regulatory target ratio (8%
for international banks and 4% for domestic banks).
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Figure 3: Value Functions
Notes: Solid lines with before and dashed lines with after show the bank values generated at
the inspection probability of p0 = 0.26 and p1 = 1 (i.e., before and after the strengthening of
surveillance pressure), respectively. To solve the bank problem, credit shocks zt that each bank
faces are discretized into 11 states (z1,z2,....,z11). z1 is the worst credit shock, z9 is the better
credit shock, and z11 is the best credit shock. We report bank values for the worst, better, and
best credit shocks.
Figure 4: Default Decisions
Notes: See Notes in Figure 3. We report default rates for the worst (z1), better (z9), and best
credit shocks (z11).
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Figure 5: Capital Ratio Decisions
Notes: See Notes in Figure 3. We report bank capital ratios for the cases of the worst (z1),
average (z6), and best credit shocks (z11).
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Figure 6: Dividend Decisions
Notes: See Notes in Figure 3. We report dividend by banks for the worst (z1) and best credit
shocks (z11).
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Figure 7: Loan Decisions (Log)
Notes: See Notes in Figure 3. We report bank loan supply for the worst (z1), better (z9), and
best credit shocks (z11).
Figure 8: Stationary Distribution of Capital Ratio
Before Strengthening Capital
Surveillance (p = p0(= 0.26))
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Notes: Left and right panels show the stationary distributions of bank capital ratio generated at
the inspection probability of p0 = 0.26 and p1 = 1 (i.e., before and after strengthening capital
surveillance), respectively.
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Figure 9: Impulse Responses to Strengthening Capital Surveillance
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Notes: The solid lines indicate that the impulse responses of the aggregate bank variables to
the increase in the inspection probability from p0 = 0.26 to p1 = 1. We assume the economy
is, initially, at the stationary equilibrium of p = p0 and the inspection probability increases to
p = p1, unexpectedly, at t = 10, that is, the announcement about the transition from incomplete
enforcement of capital regulation to complete enforcement occurs before banks’ default decisions
at t = 10.
41
